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Abstract: Tort models assume symmetry in the behavior of injurers and victims
when faced by a threat of liability and a risk of harm without compensation,
respectively. This assumption has never been empirically validated. Using a novel
experimental design, we study the behavior of injurers and victims when facing
symmetric accident risks. Experimental results provide qualified support for the
symmetric behavior hypothesis.
Keywords: precautions, tort theory, laboratory experiment
JEL Classification: K13, C91

1 Introduction
Economic models of tort law assign specific roles to the parties in an accident,
namely injurers or victims. These two parties are conventionally assumed to
be unacquainted, risk-neutral, identical in that they both maximize expected
utility, and free from any behavioral bias. Given these assumptions, tort theory
predicts that injurers and victims would exhibit symmetric behavior – i.e. the
same investments on accident prevention – when facing symmetric accident
risks (Brown 1973; Shavell 1980, 1987). We refer to this theoretical prediction as
the “symmetric behavior hypothesis.”
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Specifically, Brown’s (1973) and Shavell’s (1980, 1987) models of unilateral
care (wherein only the injurer or only the victim can take care) predict that under
no liability, the victim – who will receive no compensation, and hence bear the
full cost of harm – is incentivized to invest in optimal precaution levels, whereas
under strict liability, the injurer – who will have to fully compensate the victim,
and hence bear the full cost of the harm – has incentives to invest in optimal
precaution levels. Strict liability creates precaution incentives on the injurer with
the threat of liability, while no liability creates precaution incentives on the victim
by leaving him/her with the risk of an uncompensated loss (Cooter and Ulen 2016,
p. 228–229; Miceli 2004).1
The symmetric behavior hypothesis has not yet been empirically tested.
This lack of validation is important because tort models assume that individual decision-making is not systematically affected by one’s role (Brown 1973;
Nussim and Tabbach 2009; Shavell 1980, 1987); instead, evidence suggests that
individuals are subject to role-induced bias, i.e. they often act in accordance with
their role (Egli Anthonioz et al. 2019; Janis and King 1954; Landeo 2009, 2018;
O’Brien 2009; Simon, Snow, and Read 2004, 2015; Schweizer 2019; Sunstein 1996;
Zimbardo 1965). The fact that people undertake decisions in the role of victims or
injurers may produce role-induced effects, which can emerge unintentionally and
cannot easily be reversed (Engel and Glöckner 2013). This paper uses an experimental study designed to tackle the following question: Do injurers and victims
behave symmetrically as economic theory predicts? The answer is on average a
qualified yes.
Despite the extensive number of tort models – of either unilateral care or
bilateral care – very little is known about individuals’ actual precaution investments. This is partly explained by the fact that precautions are difficult to observe and
practically impossible to measure empirically (Guerra 2021; van Velthoven 2009).
The experimental methodology can overcome this empirical shortcoming since it
enables observing precaution investments at the individual level, absent of any
endogeneity and selection issue present in the field. Notwithstanding the advantages of the experimental methodology in overcoming observation and measurement difficulties, only a few experiments to date have been conducted to test some of
the theoretical predictions of tort models (Angelova et al. 2014; Deffains, Espinosa,
and Fluet 2019; Kornhauser and Schotter 1990, 1992; Wittman et al. 1997). These

1 Injurers and victims are also expected to exhibit symmetric behavior in situations with bilateral
care choices – wherein both the injurer and the victim can take care – and under other liability
rules (e.g. strict liability rule with contributory negligence defense versus negligence rule; Schäfer
and Müller-Langer 2009). For an extensive taxonomy of liability rules, see Dari-Mattiacci and
Parisi (2020).

Injurers versus Victims | 3

contributions have investigated the deterrent effect of specific legal rules.2 In
particular, Kornhauser and Schotter (1990) compared strict liability and negligence in a unilateral care accident context, while Kornhauser and Schotter (1992)
compared simple negligence and negligence with contributory negligence in a
bilateral care accident context. Wittman et al. (1997) compared contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and no-fault rules in a dynamic perspective,
Angelova et al. (2014) compared no liability, strict liability, and negligence, and
Deffains, Espinosa, and Fluet (2019) analyzed social norms under no law, strict
liability, and negligence when rule enforcement is either mild or severe. Except for
Kornhauser and Schotter (1990) and Deffains, Espinosa, and Fluet (2019), these
experiments generally confirmed theoretical predictions.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experimental analysis to test the
simple but important theoretical prediction of the symmetric behavior of injurers
and victims. Our research is different from the previous experimental contributions with respect to both the aim of the study and the design implemented. Unlike
other experimental studies, the problem here is no longer comparing tort incentives under different liability rules, but instead analyzing whether precautionary
behavior is affected by the role played by individuals in an accident – as either
the injurer or victim – under symmetric financial incentives. From a methodological perspective, unlike previous experiments in tort law analyzing unilateral care
accidents (e.g. Kornhauser and Schotter 1990), in our study the accident harm and
related compensation is on a real participant, and not on a hypothetical person.3
This makes the experiment design better aligned with the theoretical model that
we are testing (Plott 1999).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and derives the main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the experimental design
and procedure. Section 4 reports the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with
ideas for future research. The experiment instructions to participants (English
translation), the dataset, analysis scripts, and additional documents used in this

2 Other contributions have experimentally tested the deterrent effect of tort liability (e.g. Cardi,
Penfield, and Yoon 2012; Eisenberg and Engel 2014). See also DeJong , Forsythe, and Uecker (1985)
and King and Schwartz (1999, 2000) on auditors’ liability, and Landeo, Nikitin, and Babcock
(2007) on split-award statutes in a litigation context.
3 The unilateral care setting analyzed in this paper shares some structural similarities with
experiments on loss aversion and financial compensation (e.g. De Cremer 2010; Haesevoets et
al. 2013; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), and dictator games
(e.g. Roth 1995). For a review of this literature, see Arlen and Talley (2008), Eisenberg and Engel
(2016), Sullivan and Holt (2017).
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research and useful for replicability purposes are available in the supplementary
material.

2 Theory
The experiment conducted in this paper closely implements the structural unilateral care tort model (Brown 1973; Shavell 1980, 1987). In this section, we briefly
describe the model to clarify the structure of the experiment and define the
symmetric behavior hypothesis.
Let us consider two parties: a potential injurer (I) and a potential victim
(V). They are assumed to be identical except for their role in the accident, unacquainted, risk-neutral, and free from any type of behavioral bias. We assume that
the parties’ initial endowments are exogenous and denoted by EI for the injurer
and EV for the victim. We consider a unilateral care accident: only one party
– the victim or injurer – can reduce the probability of an accident by investing in
precaution. This leads to two possible scenarios.
In the first scenario, only the injurer can reduce accident risks by investing in precautions. Let x denote the injurer’s precaution investments, c(x)be
the precaution cost, which is increasing and convex in x, and p(x) be the
probability of an accident that causes harm L > 0, where p is declining and
weakly convex in x. Let D = L denote the amount of damage compensation
paid by the injurer to the victim. Consider the strict liability rule (ISL), under
which injurers are required to pay damages whenever an accident occurs. The
injurer’s payoff becomes ΠI ISL (x) = EI − c (x) − p (x) D, whereas the victim’s payoff is ΠV ISL = EV − p (x) L + p (x) D = EV . The social planner’s task is to maximize
the total surplus of the parties, expressed by the sum of parties’ utilities, with
respect to precaution investments. Throughout the paper, the precaution investment maximizing the total surplus is referred to as the efficient [precaution] level
or investment. Accordingly, under strict liability the potential injurer is induced
to make efficient precaution investments.
In the second scenario, only the potential victim can reduce the probability
of an accident by investing in precautions. By symmetry, let y denote the victim’s
precaution investments and p(y) be the probability of an accident that yields harm
L, where p is declining and weakly convex in y. Let c(y) be the precaution cost,
which is increasing and convex in y. Consider the no liability rule (“VNL”), under
which injurers are never required to compensate victims for the harm caused by
an accident. In this case, the potential victim bears the full accident loss, plus the
cost of precaution c(y). Thus, the victim maximizes ΠV VNL (y) = EV − c(y) − p (y) L,
whereas the injurer’s payoff remains constant at ΠI VNL = EI . The social planner’s
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task is to maximize the total surplus of the parties with respect to y. Accordingly,
under no liability the potential victim is induced to make efficient precaution
investments.
Injurers under strict liability (ISL) and victims under no liability (VNL) bear
the full accident and precaution costs, and thus they have identical precaution
incentives. This simple theoretical result provides the first, main hypothesis for
the experimental analysis, as stated below:
Hypothesis: Symmetric Behavior
All else being equal, ISL and VNL exhibit the same precautionary behavior.

3 Experiment
We use a novel experiment that builds in all necessary assumptions of the theory
that it designed to test (Plott 1999). Put simply, the theoretical model that we are
testing assumes that players actually suffer harm, pay costs of taking precautions,
and are made to pay or receive compensation.

3.1 Design
In our Accident Game, we used a within-subject design with two treatments: ISL
and VNL (more details in Section 3.1.1).4 The game comprised two stages, with
one treatment in each stage. Each stage comprised ten independent and identical
periods (subjects’ earnings in one period were not affected by their choices and
earnings in the other periods).5
At the beginning of the experiment, half of the participants were randomly
assigned the role of Player A and the other half were assigned the role of
Player B. The roles remained fixed throughout the study. At the beginning of

4 The overall experiment comprised three main parts: the Accident Game, followed by a Risk
Aversion test and a Social Value Orientation test. At the end of the experiment, subjects were
asked to answer a survey on socio-demographic information. Given the purpose of this paper and
the within-subject design of the Accident Game, we have omitted any analysis on risk aversion,
social value orientation, as well as individuals’ characteristics. For more information on the
two tests and the post-experiment survey, see the experiment instructions in the supplementary
material.
5 At the end of the study, the computer randomly selected two of the overall periods at the subject
level for actual payment. Participants were informed that they would not know in advance which
period was going to be selected to determine the actual payment, and that each period had an
equal probability of being selected.
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the first period, the computer randomly formed two-member groups with one
Player A and one Player B. In each of the following periods, each player was
randomly and anonymously re-matched with another player of the opposite role.
At the beginning of each period, each player received an initial endowment
of 140 tokens (1 token = A
C 0.01). In each period, Players A were asked to decide
how many tokens they wanted to invest in precautions to avoid an accident with
their matched Players B. Given the unilateral care setting, Players B could not take
any action to avoid the accident and remained passive throughout the experiment
(for a similar design with “active” and “passive” players, see e.g. Eisenberg and
Engel 2016).
At the end of each period, participants learned whether an accident happened
or not,6 their own period payoff, and their matched player’s period payoff. Players
A’s precaution investments were therefore private information. After receiving this
information, subjects moved to the next period. After the ten periods in the first
stage, participants were given a new set of instructions for the second stage and
learned that they would play another ten periods, albeit under a different scenario.

3.1.1 Treatments
The experiment used a within-subject design with two treatments: ISL and VNL.
In two out of four experimental sessions, those assigned the role of Player A
played ISL in the first stage (first ten periods), and VNL in the second stage (last
ten periods). The treatment order was reversed in the other two experimental
sessions: Players A played VNL in the first stage and ISL in the second stage.
If an accident occurred in the ISL treatment, Player B would suffer the initial
loss, but Player A would fully compensate him/her for the damage suffered. In
the VNL treatment, if an accident occurred the loss would fall upon Player A and
he/she would not receive any compensation. The expected payoffs of Player A in
the two treatments were thus identical: in the event of an accident, Player A would
always face the full accident loss either as liability toward Player B (ISL treatment)
or as uncompensated loss to him-/herself (VNL treatment). Identical screens and
payoffs were presented to Players A – when acting as injurers and victims – to
reaffirm the identity of financial incentives that they faced (see supplementary
material).

6 For each two-member group, the computer rolled a number between 0 and 100. If the number
was between 0 and the probability of having an accident, an accident would occur between the
matched pairs.
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3.1.2 Parameters
Table 1 shows the parameters upon which Players A were asked to decide.
Table 1: Parameters.

Precaution Precaution investment Probability of accident Expected earnings Earnings
Level z
c (z) = 4z+z2
p (z) = 0.85−0.10z
player A
player B
140 − c(z) − p(z)L
0

−0 tokens

1

−5 tokens

2

−12 tokens

3

−21 tokens

4

−32 tokens

5

−45 tokens

6

−60 tokens

85% accident
15% no accident
75% accident
25% No accident
65% accident
35% no accident
55% accident
45% no accident
45% accident
55% no accident
35% accident
65% no accident
25% accident
75% no accident

60 tokens
140 tokens
55 tokens
135 tokens
48 tokens
128 tokens
39 tokens
119 tokens
28 tokens
108 tokens
15 tokens
95 tokens
0 tokens
80 tokens

140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens
140 tokens

In each treatment, Players A were asked to decide the investment in precautions, z, that they wanted to undertake in a range from 0 to 6 precaution
units. Each additional unit of precaution yielded a constant marginal benefit by
reducing the probability of an accident by 10%, and it entailed an increasing
marginal cost. The probability of an accident was given by the following function: p (z) = 0.85 − 0.10z, where z ∈ [0, 6]. The probability of a loss thus ranged
between 25% (if Player A chose the maximum amount of precautions) and 85%
(if Player A chose not to invest in precautions).7
The cost of precautions was defined by the following function: c (z) = 4z + z2 ,
with z ∈ [0, 6]. The cost of precautions thus ranged from 0 (if Player A chose
not to invest in precautions) to 60 (if Player A chose the maximum amount
of precautions). If an accident occurred, the monetary loss L was 80. Negative
payoffs were not possible.

7 We chose constant instead of decreasing marginal benefits to mitigate individual biases in
judgments about risk and probabilities (cf. Camerer and Kunreuther 1989).
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In both treatments, Player A’s expected earnings were computed as the
initial endowment minus precaution costs, minus expected accident loss, i.e.
140 − c (z) − p (z) L. Assuming risk neutrality,8 Player A’s optimal investment in
precaution is z = 2, which is equivalent to an investment in precaution of twelve
tokens.
Player B’s earnings were always equal to 140 tokens, because they either
received full compensation from Player A for the accident loss under the ISL
treatment or never had to pay compensation to Player A for the accident loss
under the VNL treatment.

3.2 Procedure
We conducted four experimental sessions – comprised of twenty periods each
– each with 50 participants (25 Players A and 25 Players B). A total of 200 Spanish
participants were involved in the experiment. The relevant data were collected
only from 100 “active” Players A, while the other 100 Players B were involved and
paid, but “passive”.9
Two of the four sessions started with ten periods of ISL and ended with
ten periods of VNL. The other two sessions started with ten periods of VNL and
ended with ten periods of ISL. We ran two sessions of each ordering. No subjects
participated in more than one session.
The experimental sessions were conducted during the 2017–2018 academic
year at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental and Behavioral Economics

8 The complete experiment included a risk aversion test after the Accident Game (see the
experiment instructions in the supplementary material). We tested individuals’ risk preferences
using a lottery choice à la Holt and Laury (2002). We found no significant effect of the parties’
level of risk aversion on their levels of precautions between the two treatments. Results are
available upon request.
9 A power analysis was not conducted – neither prospective nor retrospective – because insufficient and not comparable published data are available to support sample size determination
(Gelman and Carlin 2014). Our per session/treatment sample size is comparable to other, related
tort experiments: e.g. see Kornahuser and Schotter (1990, 1992) with approx. 10 and 20 subjects
per treatment, respectively; Wittman et al. (1997) and Angelova et al. (2014) with 12 and 32
subjects per session, respectively. Our current data and results can be fruitfully used for power
analysis and other design calculations in future, similar research. On null results and power
analyses, see, e.g. Good and Hardin (2012), Drichoutis, Lusk, and Nayga (2015), Kingsley (2015),
Nikiforakis and Slonim (2015), and van de Ven and Villeval (2015). On a critical discussion on
performing ex-post design calculations, see e.g. Gelman and Carlin (2014).
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(LINEEX) of the University of Valencia in Spain.10 The experiment was designed
using zTree (Fischbacher 2007) and participants performed all of the experimental
tasks via computer.11
Subjects were recruited using the LINEEX lab participant database.12 The
“active” participants (Players A) were 51.00% males, were aged in the range of
18–30 years (on average 20.22 years old), and were undergraduate students from
different fields, mainly Economics (24.00%) and other Social Sciences (21.00%).
As is standard in economics experiments, individuals’ decisions were kept
anonymous and confidential. To assure participants about anonymity vis-à-vis
the experimenter, before starting the session they were asked to sign a consent
form – of which an English translation is provided in the supplementary material
– where we informed them about their rights, including the anonymity of their
decisions.13 To ensure anonymity in practice, when entering the lab subjects
were randomly assigned to one workstation number, with no way of linking their
identities to their workstation number and the associated decisions gathered by
the software. In addition, the payments were made in cash at the end of the
session, confidentially to one participant at a time.
Instructions in Spanish (see the supplementary material for English translation) were displayed both on each participant’s computer screen and the
laboratory computer screen, as well as being read aloud. Questions were answered
in private. To control for experimenter effects, the same lab assistant conducted
all of the sessions.
At the end of the instructions for each stage of the Accident Game, and before
starting the game, subjects were asked a set of computerized control questions
to check their understanding of the instructions. To ensure understanding and
prevent similar mistakes during the experiment, participants were provided with
prompt feedback via computer and were asked to raise their hand when they had

10 The experiment was conducted in line with LINEEX’s ethics policies. Participants were permitted to opt out at any time with no penalty and were allowed to withdraw their data subsequent to
participating. LINEEX operates under the methodological paradigm of experimental economics,
where participant deception is not allowed.
11 Computer clients at LINEEX are partitioned to avoid eye contact and communication between
participants, and ensure confidentiality. During the experiment, no form of communication was
allowed between participants.
12 LINEEX has an existing database of active participants, who are undergraduate and graduate
students. LINEEX has strict policies on the confidentiality of the data provided by participants.
See https://lineex.es/en/home/ (Last accessed: April 2021).
13 In case a participant would have not completed the consent form, we would have asked
him/her to leave the session, and we would have replaced him/her with another new participant.
This case did not happen in any of our experimental sessions.
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an incorrect answer. In this case, the lab assistant approached the student who
raised the hand and explained the answer in private to ensure that they knew
the reason for their mistake. No problems or major issues were encountered. The
detailed deliverable about the experimental sessions – with results from the check
questions as well as any other questions raised by participants in each session
and stage – is available in the supplementary material.14
Two periods of the Accident Game (one period from the first stage and
one period from the second stage) were randomly selected for payments.15 The
exchange rate (1 token = 1 cent of Euros) was calibrated such that the average
hourly earnings to participants would be approximately equal to the average
hourly wage for student employment.
It is worth remarking that the experiment’s framing and wording needed to
convey four fundamental elements: (a) the accident scenario; (b) the respective
roles of the parties in the accident; (c) the purely financial and monetary nature
of the accident; and (d) the symmetric effects of the actions and the consequences
of the loss. The framing of the experiment and the wording of the instructions
reflected these objectives. The wording was carefully chosen to ensure that the
subjects identified themselves with the role assigned to them in the accident
scenario while avoiding any framed setting that evoked any potential link to
physical pain or bodily injuries associated with a tort accident. The instructions
included the terms “precautions” and “accident”. However, the terms “harm,”
“victim,” and “injurer” were replaced with the terms “monetary loss”, “party
suffering the monetary loss” and “party causing the monetary loss”, respectively.
It is worth clarifying that not with standing the use of those terms, we are uncertain
about whether subjects actually perceived the monetary loss as being caused by
Player A in the ISL treatment or Player B in the VNL treatment.16

14 It is worth reporting that overall, 14.5% of subjects (29 out of 200) incorrectly answered
question C (“If an accident occurs, who suffer the accident loss – Player A or Player B?”). The
lab assistant conducting the experiment adequately explained the reason why the answer was
wrong, and we are confident that subjects understood the explanation.
15 Final earnings were calculated as the sum of earnings in two random periods of the accident
experiment, one random period of the Risk Aversion test, and one random period of the Social
Value Orientation test. In addition, each participant received a participation payment (show-up
fee) of 5 Euros. The sessions lasted approximately 90 min (including welcome and exit). Players
A (Players B) earned an average of 11.43 (12.5) Euros including the participation payment, with
a minimum payment of 8.5 (10.3) Euros and a maximum payment of 14.4 (14.6) Euros.
16 We thank two anonymous referees for highlighting this.
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4 Results
Table 2 reports summary statistics of Players’ A precaution investments, both
by treatment (“Injurer Strict Liability” and “Victim No Liability” columns) and
pooled across treatments (“Pooled sample” column).
Table 2 shows that on average across periods, injurers and victims spent the
same amount of approximately eighteen tokens on precautions (18.504 for injurers versus 17.918 for victims; two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p value = 0.676;
two-tailed t-test, p value = 0.444; n = 2000). Similar results hold if comparing
injurers and victims’ precaution investments in each stage and each period, and
they are robust to tests for the equivalence of means within a symmetric equivalence interval using a two one-sided t-test approach (Dinno 2017; Schuirmann
1987). On average across periods, no significant differences are detected neither
in the mean nor in the variance of precaution investments between treatments
(17.454 for injurers versus 16.818 for victims; Two-sample variance-comparison
test p value = 0.241; Levene’s robust test statistic p value = 0.201).
These statistics are confirmed by regression analyses, whereby the results
are reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is Precaution Investment, which
represents Players’ A precaution investments and can take seven values, i.e. 0, 5,
12, 21, 32, 45, or 60. The key explanatory variable – Victim – is a dummy equal to
1 for the VNL treatment and 0 for the ISL treatment. Columns 2 and 3 respectively
add Second Stage – equal to 1 for the second stage, and 0 for the first stage
– and its interaction with Victim. We estimate the models using random-effects
panel ordered logistic regressions, with robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level to adjust for heteroscedasticity and dependency of observations
across periods.
The regression estimates show that all coefficients are not statistically significant, thus revealing a null average treatment effect, which supports the hypothesis
on symmetric behavior, as described in Section 2.
Result: Injurers versus Victims
On average, ISL and VNL undertook the same investments in precautions.

18.984
19.281
17.167
18.536
19.404
17.669
18.987
17.684
16.269
17.944

21.920
22.640
19.340
20.460
20.100
21.620
19.820
15.980
13.940
15.620

Second stage

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

16.528
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

21
21
21
21
21
21
16.5
12
5
12

14.550

21
12
16.5
21
21
16.5
12
8.5
12
5

Median

Max

N

zVNL

sVNL

60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60

58.5

60
60
45
60
60
60
60
60
60
60

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

500

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

19.760
17.020
15.660
16.900
18.980
17.840
16.920
18.920
16.360
19.220

18.078

17.220
20.520
19.000
15.800
17.060
16.100
17.920
20.920
19.200
17.040

17.834
16.477
15.087
15.618
15.144
15.894
15.015
17.564
16.852
18.272

17.333

16.332
15.571
17.578
14.813
17.184
19.416
17.866
19.498
18.061
17.015

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Min

21
12
12
12
21
21
16.5
16.5
12
12

13.100

12
21
12
12
12
5
12
21
12
12

Median

(n = 50 per period)

Min

(n = 50 per period)

17.864

sISL

Average

zISL

Victim no liability

Injurer strict liability

15.671
14.222
13.902
18.089
17.164
16.952
19.110
17.507
17.486
15.172

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Period

19.620
17.680
17.960
20.020
20.560
18.120
18.260
15.420
17.980
13.020

First stage

Stage

Table 2: Summary statistics of precaution investments.

60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60

60

60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60

Max

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

500

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

N
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18.193

17.454

19.144

18.504

Average

Total

0

0
12

17.150

Median

Max

N

zVNL

sVNL

60

60
1000

500
17.918

17.758
16.818

16.376
0

0

Min

12

15.600

Median

(n = 50 per period)

(n = 50 per period)
Min

Victim no liability

Injurer strict liability

60

60

Max

N

1000

500

z and s represent the mean and standard deviation of Players’ A precaution investments, respectively; zISL and zVNL represent the mean of Players’ A
precaution investments in the Injurer Strict Liability (ISL) and Victim No Liability (VNL) treatments, respectively; sISL and sVNL represent the standard
deviation of Players’ A precaution investments in the ISL and VNL treatments, respectively.

sISL

Period

zISL

Stage

Table 2: (continued)
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Table 3: Injurers versus victims.

DV: Precaution investment
Victim

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.073

−0.074

−0.068

(0.124)

(0.123)
0.101
(0.124)

(0.310)
0.107
(0.353)
−0.012
(0.630)

2.269∗∗∗
(0.476)
−3352.163
0.346
0.557
2000
100

2.275∗∗∗
(0.478)
−3351.391
0.926
0.629
2000
100

2.275∗∗∗
(0.478)
−3351.391
0.969
0.809
2000
100

Second stage
Victim × second stage

𝜎2
Loglik

𝜒 2 (1)
Prob > 𝜒 2
N
N clusters

The dependent variable (DV) represents precaution investment by Players A, and can take
seven values, i.e. 0, 5, 12, 21, 32, 45, or 60. The key explanatory variable – Victim – is a
dummy equal to 1 for the Victim No Liability treatment and 0 for the Injurer Strict Liability
treatment. Columns (2) and (3) respectively add Second Stage – equal to 1 for the second
stage, and 0 for the first stage – and its interaction with Victim. Parameter estimations are
from random-effects panel ordered logistic models, with robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level in parentheses. +p < 0.10 ∗ p < 0.05 ∗∗ p < 0.01 ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

5 Conclusion
This paper has tested one of the core theoretical predictions of tort models, namely
that injurers and victims are expected to have symmetric reactions to symmetric
accident risks (i.e. making identical precaution investments). For this purpose,
we used a novel experimental framework to evaluate individuals’ precaution
choices in the lab. Our results provide qualified support for the symmetric behavior hypothesis, laying empirical foundations for the prediction generated by the
economic models of tort law.
Our research calls for further investigations into the motivations driving precaution investments under different roles. Among others, open questions for
future research follow from the choice variables available to participants. Specifically, in our design – as in other similar experiments (e.g. Kornhauser and
Schotter 1992) – participants can only choose precaution investments, but neither whether nor the extent to which to engage in risky activities. This allows us
to depict a causal connection between the injurer’s care choice and the resulting
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harm, but not a causal connection between the injurer’s activity and the resulting
harm. Future research should delve into this important aspect; for example, by
providing subjects with the possibility to choose risky activity levels, in addition
to precaution investments. This would improve the design’s adherence to the
implicit assumptions of standard tort models, i.e. that a duty of care runs from the
injurer to the victim and that there is a causal connection between the injurer’s
activity and the resulting harm.
By considering our paper alongside the rather scarce literature on laboratory experiments in the realm of tort law (e.g. Angelova et al. 2014; Guerra
2021; Kornhauser and Schotter 1992; Wittman et al. 1997), we start to observe
the consolidation of a body of literature confirming the robustness of tort theory
to experimental validations (cf. Zamir 2020). Applying experimental methods to
further test tort theory is a valuable strategy to improve our understanding of
individual behavior in a wider range of accident situations (e.g. bilateral care
scenarios) and strengthen our confidence in the predictive value of the existing
economic theory of tort law.
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